

Pathways to Trump: Republican Voters in 2016

Abstract

The 2016 candidacy of Donald Trump has drawn considerable interest among social scientists and it invites a broader investigation into analyzing the dynamics of primary elections. We identify four key popular accounts that supposedly explained Trump's support: authoritarianism, populism, ethnic prejudice, and white working class status. With a unique survey panel to explore changing support for Republican presidential candidates over the primary season, we test these competing theories and examine attitudinal shifts that propelled the Trump candidacy forward. Additionally, evaluate the influence of traditional perceptions of success that respondents held about Trump and the decision to support him during the primaries. We find that populist attitudes were considerably more important than authoritarian dispositions in explaining support for Trump among Republicans during the 2016 primary season. We also show that negative feelings towards Muslims predicted support for the eventual winner.

Introduction

Although he previously expressed interest in running for president as an independent, a member of the Reform party, and as a Republican, Donald Trump's 2016 presidential candidacy was unique. In his 2015 announcement, he emphasized the themes of offshoring jobs and trade deals that ran counter to longstanding Republican orthodoxy, but he also highlighted the issues of immigration, national debt, and Islamic terrorism. The electoral coalition that emerged to support Donald Trump surprised many observers of American politics. He was considered too unprepared for a serious campaign and the presidency, out of the mainstream of Republican opinion on key issues, and too unconventional in style and rhetoric to fit his party. Yet, he won in a manner similar to other successful Republican nominees. He started the primary season as a frontrunner and then, with a few stumbles, expanded his base of support within the party, acquired double the number of delegates of his closest competitor by mid-March, and then steadily added the delegates required to win the nomination.

Trump's electoral coalition evolved over the 18-month electoral cycle. Popular commentary emphasizes that working class whites were a critical and early component of Trump's support, but the gradual and incomplete acquisition of support from other Republicans deserves examination. We consider who moved to Trump through the major stages of the nomination process, test conceptions of the factors that drew Republican voters to Trump, and observe how electoral momentum and the winnowing of candidates fed supporters to Trump and his major competitors. In this paper, we evaluate the fit of two important themes in the study of American political behavior—authoritarianism and populism—to support for Trump's candidacy. During the 2015-2016 campaign cycle, both social scientists and informed commentators drew the connection between these themes and Trump's appeal. These themes also were joined with other narratives—one about the economic interests

of the working class and one about race—that emphasized Trump’s appeal to working class whites. We consider how these claims about Trump supporters—their authoritarian, populist, racist, and class traits—shaped Trump’s electoral coalition.

While investigations into the Trump candidacy are of interest to explaining and dismissing apocryphal narratives about his support, our findings have broader implications, as well. We contribute to the understanding of the dynamics of primary campaign support. American presidential primaries are distinct for the longitudinal nature and their ostensibly politically homogeneous electorate. Competition within a party restrains our focus on ideological proximity, candidate qualities, and electability that tend to be less important in general elections. Furthermore, the setting of the campaign over several months invites researchers to examine whether predictors of support vary by date within the same contest. Indeed, the candidacy of Donald Trump puts many new and old theories about American politics into relief, but we believe it speaks to the wider dynamics of primary campaigns. Leveraging a unique data set, we are able to identify individual patterns of primary candidate support over the 2015–2016 campaign and confirm and dismiss several popular theories regarding primary success.

The Trump Candidacy and Theories of Latent Attitudes

The Trump candidacy generated two overlapping theoretical accounts of his early popularity. Perhaps the most prominent theme from popular media was Trump’s association with authoritarianism. The second emphasis was the emergence of populism, or sometimes right-wing populism. These are related but distinct accounts of Trump’s early support. We begin by providing an introduction to studies of authoritarianism and populism, contrast the two accounts, and briefly review how the two accounts infiltrated popular discourse about

Trump's candidacy.

Authoritarianism

Authoritarianism has been studied since at least the mid-20th century. Writing in the wake of the rise of European Fascism, members of the Frankfurt School identified the authoritarian personalities as those likely to gravitate towards authority figures (Adorno et al. 1950). Stenner's *The Authoritarian Dynamic* (2005) brought latent authoritarian tendencies in modern America back to the surface of social science. For Stenner, an authoritarian is a person "who cannot treat with natural ease or generosity those who are not his own kindred or kind, who is inclined to believe only 'right-thinking' people should be free to air their opinions, and who tends to see others' moral choices as everybody's business indeed, the business of the state" (Stenner 2005, 1). These tendencies may be so "deep-seated" that "neither they nor we have much capacity to alter." Authoritarians place a high value on social order so their authoritarianism is most likely to guide their political preferences when primed by elites who emphasize threats to the old order, the threats of outsiders, and challengers to important social values.

Stenner's work emerged from a line of argument made by Feldman and Stenner (1997) and Hetherington and Weiler (2009), in which authoritarianism is treated as a personality profile rather than a political preference or party affiliation. Hetherington and Suhay (2011) show that more authoritarian attitudes can emerge from Americans who did not previously show strong authoritarian dispositions when they perceive a threat for terrorism. "Authoritarian thinking" might emerge even for people without authoritarian personalities. However, weaker stimuli, such as a gradual change in social norms, do not generate authoritarian thinking.

Weiler and Hetherington (2006) have taken the argument a step farther by popular-

izing the view that authoritarianism underlies the partisan polarization of recent decades. They assert that “authoritarianism is central both to understanding the nature of the contemporary political divide and why Republican issue appeals, which have been increasingly organized around authoritarian-inspired issues, have been so effective.” They observe that authoritarians are disproportionately white, less-well educated, and religious. Trump, to draw a reasonable inference from this perspective, primed a not-so-latent authoritarianism more effectively than other Republican candidates.

The link of Trump’s success to authoritarianism received considerable media attention.¹ Extreme views—for example, support for banning Muslims—seemed to run high among Trump supporters. In one report, location on an authoritarianism scale had a significant discriminating effect among Republicans in their support for Trump.² The authoritarian interpretation was contested in a popular political science blog by political scientists Rahn and Oliver (2016), based on a survey conducted in mid-March 2016, but the dominant theme of media coverage seemed to reinforce the Weiler-Hetherington view that authoritarianism underlies modern political divisions.³

When discussing authoritarianism, it is important to note the disagreement in mea-

¹For more discussion of authoritarianism and Trump support, see http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-weiler/understanding-trump---its_b_11338384.html; <http://www.vox.com/2016/3/1/11127424/trump-authoritarianism>; <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/donald-trumps-authoritarian-politics-of-memory/514004/>; <http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/10/the-gops-age-of-authoritarianism-has.html>

²<http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/01/donald-trump-2016-authoritarian-213533>.

³See also https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/09/trumps-voters-arent-authoritarians-new-research-says-so-what-are-they/?utm_term=.1e1678028796

surement. On the one hand, social psychologists identify “right-wing authoritarians” as those who are “relatively submissive to those they consider established authorities, aggressive when they believe that authorities sanction aggression, and conventional” (Altemeyer 2004, 426). Scholars typically identify the level of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) using a battery of questions which is used to scale respondents’ adherence to right-wing conventions and submission and responsiveness to authorities’ calls for aggression. While this measure has been found to be highly reliable, others question its usefulness. For example, Feldman (2003) and Stenner (2005) note that the measure is perhaps insufficiently distinct from conservatism. Many argue in favor of measuring authoritarianism with a battery of questions regarding the nature of child-rearing, as asked in the ANES, that is disconnected from contemporary politics. This battery includes items that are intended to measure how a respondent values respect to authority figures and individual autonomy, while separating such values from social conservatism. The use of this four-item scale is widely accepted and found to be a strong predictor of attitudes theoretically associated with authoritarian personalities (see Feldman 2003, Stenner 2005, Hetherington and Weiler 2009, Perez and Hetherington 2014).

Donald Trump’s appeal to authoritarian personalities may have been grounded in the tension between the values of autonomy and obedience in a way that was divorced from traditional right-wing convention. For this reason, it might be worthwhile to test how well responses to the ANES child rearing battery predict support for the eventual winner. Yet, at the same time, the Trump phenomenon of most interest occurred within a right-wing framework of the presidential primary. Furthermore, much of the popular account that drew a connection between support for Trump and aggression towards other groups, particularly when encouraged by the elite himself. For this reason, we employ a strategy that focuses on right wing authoritarianism in the tradition of Altemeyer (1996) in our main analyses. Nonetheless, we include analyses that compare the effects of right wing authoritarianism and

authoritarianism as measured by the child-rearing battery.

Populism

In contrast to authoritarianism, which political scientists now treat as a personality trait, *populism* is a label attached to a set of political attitudes associated with some political movements and parties (Jansen 2011; Nicholson and Segura 2012). A common theme in populist movements is that ordinary citizens are exploited by a privileged, corrupt elite—the “little guy” against big government and big business. It is most famously associated with farmer movements against railroads and Eastern manufacturing interests in the late 19th and early 20th century. At times, both major parties have been splintered by populist factions and, in the aftermath of the Great Recession, both parties have again shown a kind of factionalism stimulated by the candidacies of Trump and, for the Democrats, of Bernie Sanders.

Trump’s emphasis on “draining the swamp,” the biases of the major media, and the us-against-them battle are shared with older populist traditions. Because Democrats have benefited from an advantage over Republicans in being viewed in populist terms (Nicholson and Segura 2012), Trump’s emergence as a leading Republican candidate with populist themes made his candidacy distinctive and created the possibility of significant change in the electoral coalitions of the two parties. This development raises the question about the contribution of populist attitudes to motivating support for Trump during the primary season.

Somewhat less prominently, observers emphasized Trump’s populism. In this case, the emphasis was on a conservative brand of populism that some observers struggled to define. For some observers, it was connected to the right-wing populism of George Wallace, Pat Buchanan, and some leaders of the Christian right. The trade and immigration themes

of the Trump platform pitted Trump against long-standing Republican policy positions and appealed to non-traditional Republicans.⁴ His populism has been questioned since his election, but during the primary campaign his populist themes clearly distinguished him from most of his Republican competitors.

On the surface, authoritarianism and populism appear to share some general themes. A perception of threat, deep faults in the social order, and even hidden conspiracies appear to be common features of both sets of attitudes. Indeed, social scientists have recognized these common threads for some time (Holbo 1961; Tucker 1956; Oliver and Wood 2014). Although the outsider threat of authoritarian thinking is distinct from the elite threat of populism, there is nothing to prevent someone from perceiving both types of threats. In fact, it is easy to see how political rhetoric can readily address both themes. Trump emphasized both the role of trade agreements and immigration as threats to jobs, and the benefits of trade agreements and shipping jobs abroad to domestic elites. Claims about threats to the social order and deep biases in that social order were readily combined.

Working Class Whites

Another dominant theme of most popular accounts of early Trump support was his support among working class whites, particularly among men. A syndrome of lost manufacturing jobs and downward mobility, pessimism about the future of their children, rising income inequality, and declining health and life expectancy made the Trump message appealing (e.g. Case and Deaton 2015).⁵ Survey data during the primary and general election campaigns

⁴<http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/03/donald-trump-the-perfect-populist-21369>

⁵<http://www.prrri.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/PRRI-AVS-2015-Web.pdf>; <http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/archived-projects/economic-mobility-project>

and the surge in turnout in certain counties appear to confirm this theme.⁶ Working class whites from outside the usual Republican primary electorate gave Trump a wave of support and, because of their policy views and social values, created strategic problems for traditional Republican candidates. Elements of this narrative were age and education: Trump's appeal was strongest to middle aged Americans with less than a college education who filled the ranks of the working class. These themes were not new to social scientists (Teixeira and Rogers 2000, Zweig 2000), but they became central to popular commentary in 2015 and 2016.

The relationship between the white working class and candidates associated with authoritarian appeal has long been of interest to social scientists (Lipset 1959). More recent work evaluating the consequences of rapid trade liberalization since the 1990s and early 2000s finds strong a connection between manufacturing job loss and politics, but the directions of such effects are not clear. For example, Margalit (2011) finds that during the 2004 presidential election, incumbent vote shares were more vulnerable in counties that experienced higher job losses due to outsourcing. Although they are unable to find an anti-incumbency relationship to trade, Autor et al. (2016) show that white populations most harmed by the Permanent Normalization of Trade Relations (PNTR) with China elected more ideolog-

⁶[https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/white-working-class-men-increasingly-2016/10/05/95610130-8a51-11e6-875e-2c1bfe943b66_story.html?utm_term=.fb8ed79e1ea1;](https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/white-working-class-men-increasingly-2016/10/05/95610130-8a51-11e6-875e-2c1bfe943b66_story.html?utm_term=.fb8ed79e1ea1) [http://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-Kaiser-Family-Foundation-CNN-Working-Class-Whites-Poll;](http://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-Kaiser-Family-Foundation-CNN-Working-Class-Whites-Poll) [http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/20/politics/2016-election-white-working-class-voters/;](http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/20/politics/2016-election-white-working-class-voters/) <http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21709596-support-donald-trump-working-class-whites-not-wh> https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/28/upshot/a-2016-review-turnout-wasnt-the-driver-of-clinton.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=first-column-region®ion=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=1

ically polarized candidates. Others demonstrate that regions most affected by the PNTR had rising increases of Democratic, the party less likely to be pro-trade, vote shares (Chen et al. 2017). Findings within the German context encourage a more nuanced approach to the relationship between those in manufacturing jobs and politics. Rather than inspire a complete leftward shift on political issues, trade competition was associated with greater support of minor far-right parties with anti-immigrant and anti-trade integration platforms (Dippel et al. 2015). We might expect a candidate such as Donald Trump who emphasized the negative aspects of trade, while also promoting more restrictive immigration policies, to find large levels of support from the white working class. Still, the extent to which this support propelled him to the nomination within the Republican primary electorate remains unexamined.

Racial and Ethnic Prejudice

The notion that racial fears motivate American political behavior is not a new concept. Discussing the strength of the American South as a one-party state, Key (1949) argued that those areas with greater concentrations of Black Americans were more politically conservative and politically active due to a greater perceived racial threat. While racial threat and group competition over scarce resource motivated the explanations of Key, others point to more general racial feelings. Symbolic racism, or abstract resentment of other racial groups, have been found to be highly associated with White voting patterns (Kinder and Sears 1981). In more recent contexts, feelings of racial antipathy among White voters have proved to be influential in numerous contexts (Bobo 1983, Carsey 1995, Greenwald et al. 2009, Hopkins 2010, Tesler and Sears 2010, Tesler 2012, Enos 2016). These motivations are not limited to Whites attitudes towards Black Americans. White voters have also been found to become much more conservative with a heightened sense of threat or presence of immigration and

decline of their own majority (Hopkins 2010, Newman 2010, Craig and Richeson 2017). While most studies of the political consequences of symbolic racism have focused on Whites' attitudes towards Blacks and Latinos, little research exists on attitudes towards Muslims and Arab Americans influencing electoral behavior. Nonetheless, Ogan et al. (2014) demonstrate a strong partisan and ideological relationship between attachment to the Republican party and Islamophobia.

While studies may uncover a relationship between racial resentment and support for the conservative candidate in the general election, little research draws a connection to support within a primary electorate. With high levels of partisan sorting on cultural and economic issues, it is unclear how well partisans would discriminate between candidates on a racial dimension. Nonetheless, observers emphasized racism and noted Trump's appeal to ethnic and racial resentments among whites.⁷ In fact, the Clinton campaign openly referred to Trump's campaign of prejudice and paranoia, which probably was intended to cover Trump's views on undocumented immigrants, refugees, Muslims, Hispanics, and perhaps others, in addition to attitudes about African Americans.⁸ Trump's candidacy, in this account, exploited ethnic and racial sensitivities to develop his initial base of support.

Plainly, the arguments about the working class, authoritarian personalities, populism, and ethnicity and race are not identifying mutually exclusive groups or processes. In fact, Inglehart and Norris (2016) tie the populism to a cultural backlash that is rooted in social values that is akin to the authoritarian and racial dimensions that others have emphasized. In this account, populism is one pole of a continuum and opposite to "cosmopolitan" val-

⁷https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/11/22/peoples-views-about-race-mattered-more-in-electing-trump-than-in-electing-obama/?utm_term=.e6cbf54256ca

⁸<http://www.vox.com/2016/9/12/12882796/trump-supporters-racist-deplorables>

ues, which include multiculturalism, diversity, openness, and inclusiveness (Jackman and Vavreck 2011). Other interpretations emphasize “white populism” and similar concepts that refer to a backlash to social change, external threats, and challenges to white identity that make a combination of populist, authoritarian, and race-based themes appealing to many Americans.⁹

Primary Elections and the Challenge of Evaluating Explanations of Trump’s Support Over Time

Partisanship (Campbell et al. 1960) and ideological proximity (Jessee 2012) are two dominant predictors of vote choice within the general election framework. Within the primary context, however, where all candidates share the same party label and ideological differences are much more difficult to discern, these factors should have less explanatory power. Previous examinations of primary elections posit that primary voters are strategic by supporting not their most preferred candidate, but rather the candidate they perceive to have the best chances in the general election (Bartels 1988, Abramowitz 1989, Popkin 1991, Abramson et al. 1992, Adams and Merrill III 2014, although see Abramowitz et al. 1981). Others note that primary voters are not necessarily motivated by a general ideological congruence, but rather they vote for the candidate who prioritizes the issues they feel are most important (Aldrich and Alvarez 1994, Rapoport and Stone 2011). Still, primary electorates are often more ideologically extreme than the general public and could produce equally extreme candidates for the general election (Brady et al. 2007, although see Hirano et al. 2010).

In this analysis we add to the understanding of primary election dynamics by testing

⁹<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/02/world/americas/brexit-donald-trump-whites.html>

theories regarding authoritarianism, populism, white working class status, and racial and ethnic prejudice on candidate support in the primary process. If these arguments about Trump's distinctive or core support account for his standing at the start of the primary season, they may not account for his success in expanding his base over the course of the primary season in the first half of 2016. In that period, his competitors dropped out of the race and their supporters gradually moved to Trump and the remaining candidates. On March 15, the day of the Florida, Illinois, North Carolina, Ohio, and other primaries, Trump won 228 delegates, giving him over half of the delegates needed to win the nomination and leaving only Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, and John Kasich with any chance of overtaking him. Kasich was not in the picture as the primary season began, and Cruz showed steady growth in support as candidates dropped out.

By late March, Trump's standing in the polls had risen to the mid-40s. Little is known about the kind of support—about 20 percent of Republicans—that Trump attracted during the primary season between January and May. By May, when the last standing candidates with Cruz, Kasich, and Trump, a majority of Republicans supported one of the other candidates. Cruz was a very conservative, Tea Party-oriented candidate; Kasich was a more traditional conservative and stylishly moderate candidate. Republicans appeared to have winnowed the field to three distinctive alternatives. Thus, a complete view of Trump's early and late, core and peripheral, support requires data and methods to account for the evolution of his coalition over time.

Data and Methods

Our central concern is the evolving role of authoritarianism, populism, race and class, in shaping the composition of the Trump coalition during 2015 and 2016. We exploit The

American Panel Survey (TAPS) to trace the candidate preferences of Republican primary and general election voters and test the fit of popular accounts of the Trump candidacy.¹⁰ Panel data allow us to determine whether the major elements of the Trump story (working class, authoritarianism, racism, populism) help to account for Trump’s early support and explain willingness to shift to Trump during the primary season. Both changes in cross-sectional correlates in Trump support and propensity to shift to Trump yield insights about the emergence of a winning coalition.

Modeling the Stability of Trump Support with a Latent Markov Model (LMM)

To characterize evolving support for Donald Trump during the Republican primary campaign, we estimate a latent Markov model from August through April. Latent Markov models (LMM) are often used to identify longitudinal change of a categorical latent trait (Van de Pol and Langeheine 2002). The key assumptions underlying these models are that responses are independent and that the number of categorical latent states is finite (MacDonald and Zucchini 1997).¹¹ The models estimate a general homogenous Markov chain for each observation across the finite latent states. Additionally, they estimate latent transition probabilities across states that control for observed changes that may be the result of measurement error (Bartolucci, Farcomeni, and Pennoni 2010). It is thus possible to estimate the proportion of sample that remains in a given state, changes states, and “sticks” to a

¹⁰More information can be found at taps.wustl.edu.

¹¹To meet these assumptions, we restrict the responses to primary candidate support to “pro-Trump” (1) and “anti-Trump” (2). In this way, we maintain independence of responses across time that may be violated due to losing candidates dropping out.

state once they have changed.

The findings of this model provide insight into the movement of Republican primary voters over the campaign. We find that roughly 0.71 of the sample of Republican primary voters are expected to remain in the same category from the beginning of the pre-primary season through the end of April. A slight majority of the sample (0.55), was estimated to fall into the “never Trump” category (at least for the primary season). Only 0.16 of the Republican primary voters were estimated to be “only Trump” supporters; their latent process never deviated from the first latent classification. Nearly one-third (0.29) of Republican primary voters were estimated to change candidates at least once through April and many of those changing candidates landed with Trump. We are able to identify the conditional transition probability of a given period for the panelists, given their previous state. Table 1 presents the estimates for these movements when accounting for measurement error. Roughly 0.95 of panelists are predicted to remain in the same latent class from wave to wave. Still, we do identify that movement towards Trump away from the “anti-Trump” state is predicted to be more likely than movement away from Trump. Likewise, the results suggest that Trump supporters were slightly more likely to stick with the eventual nominee than in the “anti-Trump” state.

Table 1. Latent Markov Transition Probabilities

	Anti-Trump _t	Pro-Trump _t
Anti-Trump _{t-1}	0.950	0.050
Pro-Trump _{t-1}	0.037	0.963

While polls throughout the campaign demonstrated a near-permanence of Trump’s support, we previously had little evidence to suggest that this phenomenon occurred at the individual-level. In fact, our data demonstrate that while Trump was able to siphon off marginal voters from other candidates from month to month, those primary voters in his camp remained very

loyal. Likewise, those voters who were against Trump were nearly equal in their stability of opposition. Nonetheless, over the course of the primary campaign change in support for Donald Trump did occur. To identify the sources of this change, we employ a series of multivariate analyses.

Multivariate Analysis

For the analysis of the primary months, we restrict our attention to panelists who reported that they participated in their home state’s Republican primary or caucus. The dependent variables for each month are whether the panelist intended to vote for Trump in the primaries if their state were to hold a primary or caucus on the day of the data collection.¹²

To test arguments about the composition of the Trump electorate, we estimate stacked longitudinal models and Cox proportional hazard models that exploit the multi-wave panel data. To estimate the effect of being in the white working class, we include a dichotomous indicator for race, where *white* is coded with a 1 and all other panelists are coded as 0. Income is operationalized using a five category variable based on CPS income quintiles.¹³ The baseline *income quintile* is for those panelists with an annual income above \$125,000. For education level, we employ a binary indicator where 1 corresponds to *college graduate* and 0 otherwise.¹⁴ *Party identification* is measured on a seven-point scale ranging from

¹²We conducted a similar analysis with those panelists reporting to have voted for one of the two major party candidates in the general election. These findings and their discussion may be found in the Appendix.

¹³1= Less than \$20,000, 2=Between \$20,000 and \$50,000, 3=Between \$50,000 and \$80,000, 4=Between \$80,000 and \$125,000, 5=More than \$125,000

¹⁴Due to the high correlation of income and education, as well as the non-linear effects of income on Trump support, we embrace a broad identification of working class status. Thus, we expect Republican voters without a college degree will be more likely to support Trump for reasons pundits have associated

strong Democrat to strong Republican. We include a measure for the panelist's sex, coding *female* as 1 and 0 otherwise.

We also test attitudinal and personality explanations for Trump's support. First, we derive a *populism* measure from the first factor of an exploratory factor analysis of seven items meant to capture panelists' feelings about the individual and his attitudes towards elites. Panelists were provided statements, giving their level of agreement on a five-point scale. Higher values indicate more populist outlooks. Second, we create a measure for *right wing authoritarianism (RWA)* by taking the first factor of a factor analysis for a five-item battery adopted from Altemeyer (1996). Once again, panelists provided their level of agreement to statements on a five-point scale. Higher values correspond to more authoritarian outlooks.¹⁵ Third, we measure attitudes towards three minority groups: blacks, Hispanics, and Muslims. Panelists provided thermometer ratings on a 10-point scale for fourteen different social groups. *Black affect*, *Hispanic affect*, and *Muslim affect* were measured by taking the difference between the thermometer ratings for blacks, Hispanics, and Muslims and the panelist's average rating for all other groups. Higher values correspond to warmer feelings towards blacks, Hispanics, and Muslims. Fourth, we scaled responses to ten policy preference questions to create a measure of *Liberalism*. Higher values indicate more frequent liberal responses.

Table 2 displays the means for key variables for all Republican primary voters, as well as subdividing the summary statistics by supported candidate at the end of the primary season. Unsurprisingly, Republican primary voters are overwhelmingly white and on balance, male and relatively partisan. Their expressed opinions regarding Blacks and Hispanics are positive, while their expressed opinions about Muslims are overall negative. We find that

with white working class status.

¹⁵Question wordings for the populism and RWA scale may be found in the Appendix.

by the end of the primary season, Trump supporters, on average, were not distinct from Cruz voters with respect to income. While roughly 36 percent of Cruz’s support came from the lower two income quintiles, the same figure for Trump supporters was 38 percent. Yet, there does appear to be a sizable gap in the proportion of Trump supporters with a college degree, relative to the other major candidates. We also find evidence that Trump supporters were less ideologically extreme than Cruz supporters, but they were by no means moderates, especially when considering the mean level of liberalism among Kasich voters. Finally, we find that Trump voters expressed much lower levels of affect for Blacks, Hispanics, and Muslims.

The summary statistics found in Table 2 lead us to question the explanation that Trump voters displayed wildly unique levels of authoritarian tendencies. Although Trump voters were slightly more authoritarian than the average Republican primary voter, this difference was minimal. In fact, Cruz voters, on average, responded more strongly to our RWA battery. Contrast the relationship of RWA and candidate support to that of populism and candidate support. Here, we find Trump voters to be by far the most likely to display high levels of the measure. In fact, we find that the average Cruz and Kasich voter are on the opposite side of the mean Republican with respect to populism. Thus, we conclude that populism was a unique feature of the Trump electorate within the context of the primary campaign.

For the primary model of support for Trump, we regress support for the eventual winner on attitudinal variables (liberalism, authoritarianism, populism, Black affect, Hispanic affect, and Muslim affect) and demographic identities (income, gender, party identification, race, and college education) using a logit link function. We “stack” the observations across the eight waves, employing fixed effects for wave and clustering the standard errors by pan-elist.

Table 2. Republican Primary Electorate Means

	All Voters	April Trump	April Cruz	April Kasich
1st Income Quintile	0.144	0.147	0.160	0.100
2nd Income Quintile	0.202	0.237	0.201	0.146
3rd Income Quintile	0.272	0.268	0.278	0.215
4th Income Quintile	0.238	0.219	0.225	0.292
5th Income Quintile	0.144	0.130	0.136	0.246
White	0.904	0.900	0.899	0.942
Female	0.435	0.386	0.438	0.403
College Graduate	0.501	0.415	0.489	0.701
7-Point PID	5.671	5.604	5.938	5.514
Liberalism	-0.816	-0.892	-1.130	0.426
Populism	0.133	0.368	-0.033	-0.158
RWA	0.467	0.516	0.626	0.212
Black Affect (-9 to 9)	1.210	0.927	1.444	1.262
Hispanic Affect (-9 to 9)	1.209	1.089	1.423	1.240
Muslim Affect (-9 to 9)	-1.565	-1.997	-1.602	-1.266
Observations	685	236	176	144

For the model regarding the mobility and acquisition of supporters, we implement a Cox proportional hazards model. This model is commonly used in survival analysis to assess the relationship that exists between the time that passes before a certain event occurs and risk factors or exposures. The measure of effect is the “hazard rate,” in this case interpreted as the probability of supporting Trump throughout six points in time: September, October and November of 2015, and January, February and March of 2016. The covariates that we include as potential predictors of support are the demographic characteristics just described. Further, we also include time-varying covariates: opinions on whether Trump was qualified or not qualified to become president, and perceptions of whether Trump could win the Republican nomination. Our main effect of interest is the effect of these covariates on the decision of respondents to support Trump given that they have supported other candidates (or none) up to that point.¹⁶

¹⁶A change in candidate preference is reversible and so violates an assumption of hazards models. In our

Findings

The estimates for Trump support in the primary season from the stacked longitudinal models are shown in Table 3. In column I, we find some, but not overwhelming, evidence of a class effect during this earlier part of the campaign. To be sure, among Republican primary participants, it appears that Trump’s support was not strongly related to those incomes towards the lower end of the distribution; relative to the highest quintile, all estimated coefficients in this simplified model are negative. This finding suggests that, all else equal, lower incomes were not more likely to support Trump compared to the wealthiest Republicans. Still, we do find strong support of an educational association with Trump support. Those Republican primary voters with a college degree were significantly less likely to support the eventual nominee than less well educated Republicans.¹⁷ This effect is strong, but it is also most likely closely associated with attitudinal variables. Column III indicates that the inclusion of controls for attitudes reduces both the magnitude and precision of education’s effect (while keeping the negative direction).

We also find support for the argument that Trump had significant support from Republican primary voters who held less positive feelings towards minorities. Although we find little support to suggest more negative feelings towards blacks was associated with

case, very few pro-Trump changes are followed by an anti-Trump change. Estimating our Cox model by excluding panelists with both pro- and anti-Trump changes does not change our interpretations.

¹⁷Cross-tabulations of Trump support by college education indicate a relatively consistent gap across attainment level. In August, Trump captured roughly 26 percent of the non-college educated support, while only taking 17 percent of the college-educated. By April, both figures had increased, but the difference was roughly similar. Trump received 44 percent of non-college graduates, while owning 31 percent of college graduate support.

support for Trump, we find marginal evidence that those Republicans who held negative feelings against Hispanics were more likely to support the Republican nominee. Furthermore, we find particularly strong evidence that those primary voters with more negative feelings towards Muslims were more likely to identify as a Trump supporter. All else equal, rating this religious minority lower than the average group rating was associated with a significant increase in the probability of voting for Trump. This effect held when including demographic characteristics, as seen in column III.

The estimates in Table 3 indicate that an authoritarian attitude does not predict support for Trump. The bivariate correlation between RWA and Trump support is only 0.06 and has the wrong sign. In the multivariate estimates, the RWA coefficient is never significant and has the wrong sign.

In addition to estimating pooled cross-sectional relationships, we are able to leverage our panel data to determine if the effects of certain covariates change over the course of the primary campaign. Table 4 presents the interaction effects of party identification and affect towards Muslims with the monthly fixed effects. With respect to party identification, we find that relative to August, identification as a strong Republican is less likely to be associated with a Trump supporter in almost any other month. This finding is consistent with popular narratives regarding Trump's support. Trump's initial base of support was more strongly drawn from independents and Republican leaners rather than from traditional strong Republicans. Over the primary season, more strong Republicans came to support Trump and this difference dissipates.

Similarly, the interactions in Table 4 present time-varying effects with respect to attitudes towards Muslims. In the earlier months of the primary season, the effect of Muslim affect was predicted to be not significantly different from the initial month among Republican primary participants. By December, however, the discriminating effect based upon attitudes

Table 3. Predicting Trump Support among Republican Primary Voters

	<i>Dependent variable: Primary Support for Trump</i>				
	I	II	III	IV	V
1st Income Quintile	-0.134 (0.288)		-0.129 (0.388)	-0.128 (0.389)	-0.130 (0.389)
2nd Income Quintile	-0.066 (0.267)		-0.124 (0.345)	-0.123 (0.346)	-0.125 (0.347)
3rd Income Quintile	-0.055 (0.250)		-0.023 (0.316)	-0.022 (0.317)	-0.022 (0.318)
4th Income Quintile	-0.446 (0.428)		-0.830* (0.314)	-0.831* (0.322)	-0.833* (0.316)
College Graduate	-0.564* (0.154)		-0.345 (0.195)	-0.345 (0.196)	-0.346 (0.196)
7-Point PID	-0.056 (0.049)		0.007 (0.072)	-0.173 (0.093)	-0.006 (0.072)
Female	-0.269 (0.287)		-0.237 (0.199)	-0.237 (0.199)	-0.238 (0.200)
Liberalism		0.000 (0.111)	-0.019 (0.124)	-0.019 (0.125)	-0.018 (0.125)
Populism		0.507* (0.127)	0.599* (0.139)	0.600* (0.139)	0.602* (0.140)
RWA		-0.003 (0.126)	-0.074 (0.143)	-0.076 (0.143)	-0.073 (0.143)
Black Affect		-0.055 (0.049)	-0.033 (0.051)	-0.033 (0.052)	-0.034 (0.052)
Hispanic Affect		-0.080 (0.052)	-0.111* (0.056)	-0.112* (0.056)	-0.112* (0.057)
Muslim Affect		-0.144* (0.051)	-0.133* (0.052)	-0.133* (0.052)	-0.009 (0.074)
Constant	-0.477 (0.381)	-1.599* (0.185)	-1.054* (0.499)	-0.152 (0.568)	-0.844 (0.497)
Observations	4676	3328	3081	3001	3001
Clusters	642	420	389	389	389
Log Likelihood	-2755.79	-1884.76	-1711.18	-1707.85	-1705.87
FE	x	x	x	x	x
Interaction				x	x

Note: RWA denotes right wing authoritarianism

*p<0.05

significantly increases in negative magnitude. That is, the relationship between negative feelings towards Muslims and Trump supporters grew stronger over the pre-primary months.

Table 4. Interaction Effects

	<i>Interaction Effects</i>	
	Party ID	Muslim Affect
Base Coefficient	-0.206*	-0.014
	(0.098)	(0.074)
September	0.243*	-0.052
	(0.083)	(0.062)
October	0.171*	-0.109
	(0.080)	(0.061)
November	0.185**	-0.066
	(0.085)	(0.064)
December	0.096	-0.131
	(0.088)	(0.068)
February	0.241*	-0.158*
	(0.095)	(0.070)
March	0.226*	-0.235*
	(0.105)	(0.073)
April	0.215*	-0.179*
	(0.103)	(0.076)

Note: *p<0.05

To better understand the dynamism of these effects, consider Figure 1. We see that Independents are predicted to support Trump with roughly 0.25 probability, while strong Republicans are predicted to do so with about 0.15 probability. By the end of the primary campaign, however, this predicted probability among Republican identifiers has essentially converged near 0.40. Such a finding suggests that by the end of the campaign Donald Trump had a relatively diverse constituency with respect to partisan identification in the Republican primary electorate.


Still, there is some sorting of Republicans that occurred over the primary months on one variable directly relevant to arguments about Trump’s candidacy. In the earliest days of the primary, attitudes towards Muslims did not stand out as a strong predictor of support

for Donald Trump (Figure 1). We find that the predicted probability across both the most positive and the most negative primary voters was about 0.20. By the end of the primary season, those Republicans with the most negative attitudes were predicted to support Trump with a probability of roughly 0.45, while those with the most positive were predicted to so at approximately 0.25 probability. While we cannot make a causal argument regarding an inflection point, we do find the discriminating nature of this variable increases shortly after Donald Trump called for a “total and complete shutdown” of Muslims entering the United States in late November 2015.


We are also interested in seeing what drove Republican primary voters to join or resist the Trump coalition from each of our data points.¹⁸ More specifically, we are interested in assessing what type of respondent was more likely to start supporting Trump throughout the campaign. The results of the Cox proportional hazards model (Table 5) demonstrate that key attitudes are related to joining or resisting Trump. First, populism is a significant predictor of support for Trump throughout the campaign. However, we can observe that the effect of most of the demographics included in the model is not distinguishable from zero at conventional levels. Furthermore, we also included two time-varying variables to assess their effect on the propensity to start supporting Trump: whether respondents consider Trump to be qualified to be president, and whether they consider Trump could win the election. The results indicate that both of these perceptions are positively associated with the propensity

¹⁸We also conducted an alternative analysis in which we modeled current-period support for Trump using autoregressive lags of support for Trump and perceptions qualification and electability. The results of these models may be found in the Appendix in Table 9. Most interesting of these models is that, while there is a marginal effect of perceptions of electability when controlling for previous support for Trump, this effect pales in comparison to and loses its precision when paired with perceptions of qualification. Thus, we conclude that while electability may have been responsible for voters initially supporting Trump, it is less precise of a predictor among those who are not initially with Trump when considering questions of qualification.

Figure 1. Predicted Probability of Supporting Trump: PID and Muslim Affect Interacted with Wave



(a) Support by PID



(b) Support by Muslim Affect

to support him. Figure 2 illustrates these findings. The x -axis shows the different points in time, and the y -axis the probability of *not* supporting Trump. In panel a, the two curves depict the different behaviors and risk patterns between people that considered that Trump could win and those that did not think he could win. Panel b shows the same propensity but among groups that considered he was qualified or not qualified to be president. To validate the results from this analysis, we conduct tests for proportionality that were successfully passed.¹⁹

Trump Versus Cruz and Kasich

Populism, ethnic biases, and class have been found to predict Trump support among the Republican electorate, but it is unclear if these statistical relationships identify Trump as a unique Republican candidate. Traditional indicators of support, such as strength of party identification and operational liberalism, were found to have little effect on the outcome variable in pooled models. It may be that these dimensions within the Republican electorate are weak determinants of support for Trump, but they may also be strong determinants for other major candidates.

To explore whether the driving forces of Trump’s support are different from other Republican candidates late in the primary season, we estimated cross-sectional models for


¹⁹Another potential concern of this analysis is the violation of the assumption that all subjects in the sample will eventually experience the event of interest, even if it happens after the end of a study. In biomedical studies where survival rates are the quantity of interest, the assumption that individuals will eventually die is indeed fulfilled. Even though the assumption that all TAPS panelists will eventually support Trump is unrealistic, the Republican sample used for this analysis and the subsequent support for Trump of the majority of self-reported Republicans once he was a candidate in the general election helps to ameliorate the effects of the violation of this assumption.

Table 5. Survival analysis: factors associate with Trump support


	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Intention to vote for Trump
Female	-0.201 (0.161)
1st Income Quintile	-0.165 (0.290)
2nd Income Quintile	0.055 (0.261)
3rd Income Quintile	-0.026 (0.975)
4th Income Quintile	-0.425 (0.262)
College	-0.186 (0.160)
Liberalism	0.228* (0.104)
Authoritarianism	0.129 (0.124)
Populism	0.709* (0.492)
Black affect	0.005 (0.046)
Hispanic affect	-0.069 (0.049)
Muslim affect	-0.091* (0.039)
“He could win”	1.558* (0.355)
“He is qualified”	1.486* (0.209)
Other controls	Yes
Observations	1,536
LR Test	218.9* (df = 14)

*** p < 0.05

Figure 2. Probability of NOT supporting Trump (September 2015-March 2016) by attitudes towards him



(a) Perceptions of success: "He could win"



(b) Perceptions of qualifications: "He is qualified"

the April wave for Trump’s final two challengers: Ted Cruz and John Kasich.²⁰ The estimates for these models are shown in Table 6. We limited the sample to include only those primary voters who reported supporting either Trump or the relevant candidate in each column. Whereas populism maintained a substantive and significant positive association with support for Trump in the primaries, unsurprisingly, we find that it has a strong, negative effect on the likelihood of supporting either Cruz or Kasich. That is, all else equal, by the end of the primaries a primary voter with relatively low populist attitudes was likely to support the establishment or Tea Party candidate. College degrees do not predict distinctive support for Cruz or Kasich, though it should be noted that the results suggest the most highly educated primary voters were slightly more likely to vote for Kasich. Similarly, positive effects exist for the subject’s attitudes towards Muslims, but once again, we find that these effects are not distinct from zero for either alternative candidate. That is, while, attitudes towards Muslims were certainly a discriminating predictor for Trump support by the end of the campaign, we find no evidence that they were associated with any of the runners-up.

Finally, we find that operational liberalism played a significant role in support for these two alternatives. As the results indicate, Cruz performed significantly better with strong conservatives, while Kasich won the support of (relative) ideological moderates. That is, on average, supporters of these two candidates were generally on opposite sides of the traditional left-right policy space. To be sure, on a scale ranging from -2 , the least liberal, to $+1.5$, the most liberal, the mean liberalism for Kasich voters was $-.4$, while the average Cruz supporter averaged -1.1 . For Trump support, however, operational liberalism was found to be a poor predictor. In the pooled model and in an April specific estimation, support for the eventual winner was not necessarily defined by policy attitudes. On the contrary, Trump

²⁰We also estimated longitudinal models similar to those in Table 5, Column III. The results were similar to those of Table 2, suggesting that predictors of support for the final two challengers were relatively consistent.

appears to have drawn from across a broad ideological spectrum of the Republican party's voters. These contrasts in predictions suggest that by the end of the primary season Trump was not operating in a different realm of other Republican party candidates. He catered to those with high levels of populism, where other candidates won the support of those who were less populist. At the same time, Trump appears to have not won systematic support on the traditional ideological spectrum in the Republican party. Cruz and Kasich were counting on unique ideological groups, but liberalism did not play as influential a role in Trump's ascendance.

What Happened to Authoritarianism?

The scholarly and popular case that Trump brought to the surface a latent authoritarianism has not been confirmed. In fact, among Republican primary voters, right wing authoritarianism does a better job of predicting Cruz supporters, who are high in authoritarianism, and Kasich supporters, who are low in authoritarianism, than it predicts Trump supporters, who fall between Cruz and Kasich supporters on the authoritarianism scale. The simple correlation between Trump/not Trump and authoritarianism in April 2016 was 0.06, but was 0.14 for Cruz/not Cruz and -0.19 for Kasich/not Kasich. A reasonable hypothesis is that authoritarianism is closely associated with conservatism, but conservatism and strength of party identification do a better job of predicting candidate preferences among Republicans (Feldman 2003, Perez and Hetherington 2014). Among Republican primarygoers the association between right wing authoritarianism and our measure of operational liberalism is moderately strong and negative, -0.40 , indicating those with authoritarian attitudes are also likely to provide conservative policy preferences. At the same time, populism is weakly associated with the traditional left-right scale (correlation of -0.10), while maintaining a somewhat stronger association with right wing authoritarianism ($+0.24$).

Table 6. Predicting Alternative Candidate Support among Republican Primary Voters

	<i>Dependent variable: Support for ...</i>	
	Cruz	Kasich
1st Income Quintile	0.637 (0.553)	-1.658* (0.647)
2nd Income Quintile	0.277 (0.487)	-0.908 (0.466)
3rd Income Quintile	0.255 (0.470)	-0.829* (0.421)
4th Income Quintile	0.769 (0.483)	-0.331 (0.403)
College Graduate	0.151 (0.286)	0.662 (0.351)
7-Point PID	0.024 (0.100)	0.004 (0.116)
Female	0.483 (0.294)	0.111 (0.363)
Liberalism	-0.595* (0.223)	0.644* (0.228)
Populism	-0.810* (0.180)	-0.707* (0.215)
RWA	0.172 (0.222)	0.118 (0.265)
Black Affect	0.083 (0.088)	0.079 (0.102)
Hispanic Affect	0.074 (0.094)	0.016 (0.106)
Muslim Affect	0.117 (0.073)	0.131 (0.091)
Constant	-1.555 (0.762)	-0.108 (0.837)
Observations	262	224
Log Likelihood	-158.65	-119.28

*p<0.05

We further explore the relationship between authoritarianism and candidate support by replicating our panel model in column 3 of Table 3 with the omission of partisanship and operational liberalism. These variables are highly collinear with the right wing authoritarianism measure and may be absorbing whatever effect it exerts on candidate choice. Yet, as the first column of Table 7 demonstrates, removing those variables provides little evidence that right wing authoritarianism was a strong predictor of support for Trump over the course of the Republican primary. The absence of evidence of a relationship between authoritarianism and Trump support does not appear to be the result of collinearity with ideology and partisanship.

The four-item child rearing authoritarianism battery was asked on TAPS, as well. In April of 2016, bivariate correlations between the four-item authoritarian measure and support for Trump is weak (+0.09), but in the predicted direction, and is weak as a predictor of support for Cruz (+0.09). The relationship with Kasich, who attracted the support of more moderate Republicans, was found to be much more negative (-0.19). When included in the multivariate model for Trump support, the authoritarianism coefficient is positive but not statistically significant, as displayed in column II of Table 7.

While both measures of authoritarian disposition fail to predict Trump support among Republican primary voters, there is a relationship between Trump/Clinton vote in the November 2016 general election and RWA (Table 7, column III). With the large range of panelists in the general election estimates, RWA, which is related to conservatism, has some predictive value. However, child rearing authoritarianism, which is claimed to have little or no political meaning, is not significant in the general election estimates (column IV). Again, the evidence that authoritarianism was a powerful force in shaping American political divisions in the 2016 presidential election is weak at best.

Table 7. Comparing Authoritarianism Measures in the Primary and General Election

	<i>Dependent variable: Support for Trump</i>			
	<i>Primary</i>		<i>General</i>	
	I	II	III	IV
1st Income Quintile	-0.053 (0.387)	-0.156 (0.365)	1.429 (0.850)	1.326 (0.815)
2nd Income Quintile	0.008 (0.336)	-0.178 (0.314)	0.944 (0.824)	0.740 (0.767)
3rd Income Quintile	0.121 (0.310)	-0.019 (0.295)	-0.490 (0.920)	-0.602 (0.937)
4th Income Quintile	-0.782* (0.310)	-0.785* (0.296)	0.785 (0.673)	0.543 (0.673)
College Graduate	-0.364 (0.189)	-0.276 (0.192)	-0.472 (0.496)	-0.652 (0.436)
Female	-0.219 (0.189)	-0.157 (0.187)	-0.916 (0.495)	-0.652 (0.513)
Populism	0.584* (0.131)	0.609* (0.131)	0.262 (0.232)	0.449* (0.220)
RWA	-0.065 (0.128)		0.998* (0.329)	
Child Rearing Authoritarianism		0.195 (0.129)		0.538 (0.368)
Black Affect	-0.035 (0.051)	-0.037 (0.052)	-0.130 (0.116)	-0.120 (0.120)
Hispanic Affect	-0.131* (0.055)	-0.126* (0.055)	-0.028 (0.106)	-0.026 (0.102)
Muslim Affect	-0.132* (0.049)	-0.111* (0.049)	-0.047 (0.125)	-0.129 (0.118)
7-Point PID			0.699* (0.142)	0.688* (0.149)
Liberalism			-2.189* (0.380)	-2.272* (0.343)
White			1.411* (0.542)	1.139* (0.575)
Constant	-1.057* (0.316)	-1.175* (0.332)	-3.303* (1.088)	-3.072* (1.098)
Observations	3,263	3,247	800	792
Clusters	414	412		
Log Likelihood	-1812.35	-1802.25	-170.89	-174.06
FE	x	x		

Note: RWA denotes right wing authoritarianism

*p<0.05

Conclusion

Donald Trump's success confounded pundits due to his deviations from the standard Republican message, but a careful look at the empirical data provide insight into how future analyses can understand Republican presidential primary electorates. While Trump did not adhere to strict party orthodoxy, his voters were not all that different from the ideological mean of the party. Rather, Trump's success relied upon key personality traits and identity politics within the party faithful, not necessarily conservative ideals.

We have exploited an original data set to characterize the foundation of Trump's support. Our findings suggest that support may be characterized differently over the course of the pre-primary and primary season. We hypothesized that factors such as authoritarianism, populism, racism, and class promoted his early candidacy. We found that authoritarianism did not play a significant role, at least in a national sample, but found evidence for populism, bias against Muslims, and working class status. We also found marginal evidence that his earliest primary supporters were less strongly identified with the Republican party than other participants in Republican primaries. By the end of the primaries, this relationship to party identification dissipated, while affect towards Muslims increased in its association with Trump support. Although we find support that resistance to Trump support was related to beliefs about his ability to win in November, perhaps just as important to the Never Trump faction was a belief that he was unqualified for office.

We want to draw special attention to our findings on authoritarianism. While education, populism, and anti-Muslim bias, and, to a lesser degree, anti-Hispanic bias, promoted support for Trump during the primary season, authoritarianism, as usually measured, did not. Consistent with the findings of Rahn and Oliver (2016), Trump supporters were somewhat authoritarian but that did not distinguish them from other Republicans on average.

Populism, rooted in concerns that the system is stacked against the “little guy,” was far more important. We also find that Trump was unique in that the determinants of his support were more distinct from the traditional left-right dimension than other Republican primary candidates.

Trump’s advantages appeared to have stemmed from quite traditional election forces—issue positions associated with populism distinct with the traditional left-right continuum, class, and ethnic bias. For some observers, this adds up to a modern nativism that represents an important new feature of the Republican coalition. However, evidence that it represents the special appeal of Trump’s messages and style to a certain personality type was not found. The Trump electoral coalition instead follows conventional theories of political behavior; Trump was an early frontrunner and maintained his lead, and his support was driven by populism, economic class, and ethnic bias. Future studies of party primary electorates would be served well to account for these factors as predictors of support.

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Appendix

Populism

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

1. The politicians in Congress need to follow the will of the people.
2. The government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves.
3. The people, and not the politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.
4. Elected politicians sell out to big business.
5. Big corporations accumulate wealth by exploiting the people.
6. Politicians are actually interested in what people like me think.
7. Our political system has been corrupted.

Right Wing Authoritarianism

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

1. There is no one right way to live life; everybody has to create their own way.
2. Our country needs free thinkers who will have the courage to defy traditional ways, even if this upsets many people.
3. The old-fashioned ways and old-fashioned values still show the best way to live.
4. Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the 'rotten apples' who are ruining everything.
5. What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil and take us back to our true path.

Liberalism

Do you generally support or oppose

1. increasing taxes on wealth individuals
2. federal Common Core standards for schools
3. allowing illegal immigrants to eventually be eligible for U.S. citizenship
4. gun control legislation
5. same-sex marriage
6. a woman's right to an abortion
7. building the Keystone XL oil pipeline
8. repealing the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare)
9. federal regulation of greenhouse gas emissions
10. using U.S. ground troops to fight ISIS in Iraq and Syria

Child Rearing Authoritarianism

Please tell us which one you think is more important for children to have:

1. independence or respect for elders
2. curiosity or good manners
3. obedience or self-reliance
4. being considerate or being well-behaved

General Election

When we move from the primary season to the general election, Trump's support among Republicans blossoms and populism fades as a distinctive feature of the Trump coalition. To estimate support during the general election, we limit our analysis to one wave of data: November 2016. We estimate the probability of voting for Donald Trump using a logit link function. To test the hypothesis regarding the relationship between the white working class

and support for Donald Trump, we also subset our data by white respondents, attempting to identify effects regarding income quintile and educational status on the probability of voting for Trump. Table 8 presents these results. First, while the strength of party identification and operational ideology were both inconsistent predictors of support in the primary, unsurprisingly, they prove to be influential covariates for all (two-party) voters in November. To be sure, of those voting for one of the two major party candidates, 88 percent of Democrats voted for Clinton and 92 percent of Republicans in the sample voted for Trump. Policy preferences also strongly predict candidate preference. More liberal panelists were less likely to vote for the current president. Finally, we also find that gender was a significant predictor of vote choice in the general election, while it was not so among Republican primary voters. Women were significantly more likely to support Clinton than they were to vote for Trump.

Populism was associated with Trump support among Republicans during the primary season, but it lacks the effect in November. Rather, right wing authoritarianism is a stronger predictor of vote choice in November, even controlling for party and ideology. We also find that racial attitudes are weaker predictors within the general election. Muslim affect is a strong predictor in the primary model, but when controlling for party identification, liberalism, and authoritarianism among the general electorate, we find this effect dissipates. Hence, it is difficult to argue that racial attitudes had an effect independent of party and ideology on Trump support in the general election. Still we do find marginal support that negative attitudes towards blacks are associated with support for Trump in the general election.

Finally, we further investigate the dynamics of class and Trump support in the November election. In the first column of Table 8, we find that lower income quintiles were significantly more likely to support Donald Trump in the general election than those panelists who were located in the wealthiest category. Furthermore, we find strong evidence that education

is strongly related to Trump support. Those panelists with a college degree were significantly more likely to vote for Clinton than the Republican, all else equal. Finally, we find strong evidence that white voters, while controlling for a series of other covariates were significantly more likely to vote for Trump. Each of these findings would appear to be consistent with the argument that Trump drew heavy support from the white working class.

We also subset our data with just white panelists who reported voting for one of the two major party candidates. The models predict mostly the same effects. Among whites, party identification exerts a strong, positive influence on vote choice. Similarly, more conservative policy preferences are highly predictive of voting for Trump over Clinton. Right wing authoritarianism also maintains its strong relationship with the outcome variable.

Table 8. Predicting Trump Support among General Election Voters

	<i>Dependent variable: General Election, All</i>			<i>Dependent variable: General Election, White</i>		
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
1st Income Quintile	1.675*		1.539	0.324		-1.182
	(0.644)		(0.843)	(0.455)		(0.862)
2nd Income Quintile	1.824*		0.889	0.706		-1.125
	(0.689)		(0.848)	(0.424)		(0.739)
3rd Income Quintile	0.788		-0.483	0.570		-0.702
	(0.589)		(0.890)	(0.401)		(0.696)
4th Income Quintile	0.838		0.844	0.139		-0.920
	(0.543)		(0.669)	(0.441)		(0.703)
College Graduate	-0.670*		-0.401	-0.775*		-0.514
	(0.333)		(0.529)	(0.258)		(0.439)
7-Point PID	0.896*		0.705*	0.853*		0.477*
	(0.089)		(0.142)	(0.078)		(0.124)
Female	-0.231		-0.931	-0.060		0.323
	(0.316)		(0.491)	(0.255)		(0.432)
White	1.128*		1.387*			
	(0.316)		(0.545)			
Liberalism		-2.248*	-2.155*		-2.665*	-2.361
		(0.326)	(0.370)		(0.282)	(0.312)
Populism		0.041	0.028		0.608*	0.562*
		(0.181)	(0.178)		(0.266)	(0.283)
RWA		0.921*	1.128*		0.788*	0.834*
		(0.312)	(0.354)		(0.284)	(0.344)
Black Affect		-0.234*	-0.147		0.199	0.141
		(0.107)	(0.117)		(0.133)	(0.184)
Hispanic Affect		-0.048	-0.019		-0.190	-0.203
		(0.161)	(0.106)		(0.162)	(0.218)
Muslim Affect		-0.159	-0.062		-0.233*	-0.231
		(0.152)	(0.125)		(0.114)	(0.127)
Constant	-0.477	-2.664*	-3.410*	-3.206*	-0.067	-0.969
	(0.381)	(0.520)	(1.088)	(0.479)	(0.236)	(0.823)
Observations	1109	835	783	887	664	630
Log Likelihood	-392.85	-202.38	-168.78	-332.18	-135.91	-112.67

Note: RWA denotes right wing authoritarianism

*p<0.05

Autoregressive Models

Table 9. Predicting Trump Support among Republican Primary Voters, Autoregressive Model

	<i>Dependent variable: Primary Support for Trump</i>		
	I	II	III
Trump Supporter _{t-1}	3.479*	2.870*	2.973*
	(0.207)	(0.193)	(0.239)
Trump Could Win _{t-1}	0.333*		0.285
	(0.113)		(0.217)
Trump Qualified _{t-1}		0.732*	0.660*
		(0.102)	(0.145)
1st Income Quintile	-0.202	-0.190	-0.230
	(0.288)	(0.314)	(0.349)
2nd Income Quintile	-0.245	0.215	0.125
	(0.249)	(0.262)	(0.307)
3rd Income Quintile	-0.115	0.055	0.134
	(0.243)	(0.259)	(0.299)
4th Income Quintile	-0.511	-0.451	-0.335
	(0.250)	(0.255)	(0.309)
College Graduate	-0.106	-0.306	-0.216
	(0.144)	(0.157)	(0.192)
7-Point PID	-0.020	0.049	0.040
	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.063)
Female	-0.055	-0.054	-0.023
	(0.150)	(0.162)	(0.188)
Liberalism	-0.002	0.096	0.156
	(0.098)	(0.110)	(0.131)
Populism	0.815*	0.771*	0.849*
	(0.141)	(0.164)	(0.178)
RWA	-0.110	0.056	0.065
	(0.123)	(0.125)	(0.153)
Black Affect	-0.045	-0.064	-0.152*
	(0.038)	(0.046)	(0.054)
Hispanic Affect	-0.035	-0.008	0.059
	(0.042)	(0.053)	(0.059)
Muslim Affect	-0.102*	-0.108*	-0.111*
	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.048)
Constant	-2.479	-2.079*	-2.448*
	(0.427)	(0.435)	(0.502)
Observations	1820	1815	1080
Clusters	375	375	373
Log Likelihood	-642.73	-653.63	-386.72
FE	x	x	x

Note: RWA denotes right wing authoritarianism

*p<0.05